2026 July

Insurance adjusters are not mere clerks. They are expected to evaluate coverage, liability, causation, damages, credibility, documentation, and settlement value. At the same time, adjusters are not physicians, engineers, biomechanical experts, accident reconstructionists, surgeons, economists, repair professionals, or coverage counsel. This article examines the boundary between permissible claim judgment and unsupported personal opinion in California insurance claim handling, especially where an insurer denies coverage, denies liability, reduces compensation, or refuses settlement based on medical necessity, reasonableness of treatment, causation, impact severity, vehicle damage, or disputed injury damages.

The core point is practical: Adjusters may evaluate evidence, but they may not invent expertise. When a claim position turns on specialized medical, scientific, engineering, economic, repair, or legal conclusions, the insurer should have competent support for that position before treating it as a legitimate basis for denial, reduction, or refusal to settle.

Every plaintiff’s lawyer has seen the same conclusory claim note, denial letter, or lowball evaluation: “The treatment appears excessive”; “The claimed injuries are not consistent with the vehicle damage”; “The bills are unreasonable”; “We dispute causation”; or “Our evaluation is below your demand.” The problem is not merely that these statements may be unfair. The problem is that they are often unsupported. They can convert an insurance adjuster’s personal impression into a medical, biomechanical, engineering, repair, or legal conclusion.

California law permits insurers to dispute claims, investigate causation, challenge damages, and reject unsupported demands. But the carrier’s decision must be the product of a reasonable, fair, and objective investigation. A denial or reduction is only as strong as the evidence and reasoning behind it.

This article proposes a plaintiff-side framework: An adjuster may use professional judgment to evaluate ordinary claim evidence, but when the claim decision depends on specialized knowledge outside ordinary claim-handling competence, the insurer should obtain competent support before denying coverage, denying liability, reducing compensation, or refusing settlement.

California’s statutory and regulatory framework requires evidence-based claim handling

Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h), identifies unfair claims settlement practices when knowingly committed or performed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice. The provisions most relevant to unsupported denials and reductions include failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for prompt investigation and processing of claims; failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements where liability has become reasonably clear; compelling insureds to institute litigation by offering substantially less than amounts ultimately recovered; failing to settle promptly where liability has become apparent under one portion of coverage in order to influence settlement under another portion; and failing to provide a prompt, reasonable explanation of the policy, facts, or law relied upon for denying a claim or making a compromise offer. (Ins. Code, § 790.03, subds. (h)(3), (5), (6), (12), (13).)

The Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations reinforce the same principle. Title 10, California Code of Regulations, section 2695.7 requires insurers to accept or deny claims within prescribed time limits and, when denying or rejecting a first-party claim, to provide a written statement identifying the basis for denial and the factual and legal bases for each reason then within the insurer’s knowledge. The regulation also requires written denial, rejection, or dispute of third-party liability or damages. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.7, subd. (b)(1).)

Most importantly, section 2695.7, subdivision (d), requires every insurer to conduct and diligently pursue a “thorough, fair and objective investigation.” Section 2695.7, subdivision (g), also addresses unreasonably low offers and permits consideration of whether the insurer evaluated evidence submitted by the claimant and legal authority or evidence known to or reasonably available to the insurer. Together, these provisions require more than an announced conclusion. They require a reasoned claim position supported by facts, law, and, where necessary, competent technical or professional evidence.

The bad-faith foundation: The insurer must investigate before it denies

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires an insurer to give at least as much consideration to the insured’s interests as it gives to its own. In the third-party context, that duty requires the insurer to protect the insured from unreasonable exposure to an excess judgment when liability and damages create a reasonable settlement obligation. (Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 654; Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425; Johansen v. California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau (1975) 15 Cal.3d 9.)

The California Supreme Court stated the investigation rule in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809. An insurer may not deny benefits without first fully inquiring into possible bases that support the claim. The duty is not to search only for reasons to deny. The duty is to investigate fairly.

Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1617 illustrates the same principle. An insurer must diligently search for evidence supporting the insured’s claim. When the insurer seeks only evidence that defeats the claim, it risks placing its own interests above the insured’s. Plaintiff lawyers should frame unsupported denials through this lens: The issue is not merely whether the insurer disagreed, but whether it investigated in a manner that fairly considered the evidence supporting the claim.

The plaintiff-side rule: Specialized conclusions require specialized support

The practical rule is straightforward: An adjuster may rely on claim judgment for ordinary factual, documentary, administrative, or valuation issues within claims competence. But when the insurer’s decision depends on a specialized medical, scientific, engineering, biomechanical, economic, repair, or legal conclusion, the insurer should identify competent support before denying coverage, denying liability, reducing compensation, or refusing settlement.

This does not mean an expert is required in every claim. It means expert, professional, technical, or documentary support may be necessary when the reason for denial or reduction is a conclusion the adjuster is not qualified to make independently. A lay adjuster can identify a specialized question. A lay adjuster usually cannot answer that question without a qualified foundation.

For example, an adjuster may notice lengthy treatment. But whether treatment was medically necessary is a medical question. An adjuster may notice limited visible property damage. But whether the forces involved could cause a disc injury, concussion, shoulder tear, or aggravation of degeneration is often a medical, biomechanical, or accident-reconstruction question. An adjuster may notice prior degenerative findings on imaging. But whether the collision aggravated that condition is a medical-causation question.

Wilson v. 21st Century: The Supreme Court’s warning against unsupported medical conclusions

Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713 is a leading California authority on unsupported medical conclusions in claim handling. Wilson involved an underinsured-motorist claim after an automobile collision. The plaintiff’s treating physician connected her cervical condition to the crash and opined that the findings were atypical for her age. The insurer rejected the policy-limits demand, characterizing the claim as involving only soft-tissue injuries and preexisting degenerative disc disease. The California Supreme Court held that a jury could find the insurer reached that medical conclusion without a good-faith investigation and without a reasonable basis for a genuine dispute.

Wilson does not require an insurer to accept every treating physician’s opinion. It requires a reasonable investigative basis before rejecting medical causation. Once the carrier decides to replace the claimant’s medical theory with a contrary medical theory, the carrier should have a proper foundation for doing so.

The genuine-dispute doctrine does not protect speculation

The plaintiff-side lesson is direct: A carrier cannot manufacture a genuine dispute by having a nonmedical adjuster relabel traumatic injury as degeneration, overtreatment, or unrelated treatment without competent support.

Insurers often invoke the genuine-dispute doctrine, but Wilson limits that doctrine. A dispute is not legitimate unless it is founded on a basis that is reasonable under all the circumstances. The doctrine protects reasonable, evidence-based disputes; it does not protect inadequate investigations, biased evaluations, or unsupported speculation.

Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335 is often cited by insurers, but it supports the plaintiff-side distinction. There, the insurer retained professionals, including a contractor and structural engineer, to investigate the earthquake loss. The court found a genuine dispute where the record showed a supported, investigated disagreement over coverage and amount of loss.

That is the distinction. A genuine dispute is evidence-based. It is not created by a claim note saying “excessive treatment,” a denial letter saying “we dispute causation,” or a settlement offer saying only “based on our evaluation.” The dispute must be grounded in a reasonable investigation.

When expert or professional opinion is usually needed

Medical causation

Medical causation generally requires medical evidence. If a claimant submits treatment records, diagnoses, imaging, treating-physician opinions, surgical recommendations, or pain-management records, the insurer should not simply announce that the injuries are unrelated.

Examples requiring medical support include positions that the injury was preexisting, the collision did not cause the injury, the collision caused only a temporary strain, surgery is unrelated, diagnostic findings are degenerative only, symptoms are not anatomically consistent, or the accident did not aggravate a prior condition. These are medical conclusions, not ordinary claim-adjusting conclusions.

Reasonableness and necessity of treatment

The phrase “excessive treatment” is often used as if it is self-proving. It is not. Whether treatment is reasonable or necessary depends on diagnosis, symptoms, objective findings, treatment response, prognosis, clinical judgment, and accepted medical practice.

An adjuster may question treatment duration or billing amount. But if the insurer reduces compensation because treatment was medically unnecessary, duplicative, excessive, or unrelated, the insurer should identify the medical or billing-review basis for that conclusion: who reviewed the records, what was reviewed, what qualifications the reviewer held, what standards were applied, and what opinions were reached.

Low-impact or minor property-damage arguments

One of the most common unsupported defenses in automobile claims is the low-impact argument: “The vehicle damage does not support injury.” Limited visible damage may be relevant to valuation, but it does not automatically resolve medical causation. The conclusion that a collision could not cause a claimed injury is often biomechanical, accident-reconstruction, and medical in nature.

An adjuster may rely on photographs to say the visible damage appears limited. But the adjuster usually cannot say, without expert or technical support, that crash forces were insufficient to cause injury. That conclusion requires competent evidence.

Vehicle repair causation, total loss, and diminished value

Property-damage claims may also require technical support. An adjuster can rely on repair estimates, inspections, photographs, appraisals, labor rates, parts pricing, and market data. But if the carrier denies that certain damage was collision-related, disputes structural damage, rejects diminished value, or reduces repairs based on technical repair standards, the decision should be supported by a qualified appraiser, repair professional, engineer, estimator, market valuation source, or other competent source.

Complex coverage denials

Coverage denials must be tied to policy language, facts, and law. An adjuster may apply clear policy language to undisputed facts. But when the denial depends on complex legal interpretation, cooperation clauses, residency, permissive use, exclusions, misrepresentation, business-use issues, or disputed factual predicates, the insurer should obtain appropriate professional support, including coverage counsel where warranted.

A coverage denial letter should not read like a conclusion in search of a reason. It should identify the relevant policy language, facts relied upon, legal basis, and reasoning connecting the facts to the exclusion or limitation.

When adjuster judgment is enough

A fair plaintiff-side analysis should acknowledge that not every claim decision requires an expert. Adjusters are trained to evaluate ordinary claim issues. They may rely on professional claim judgment where the issue is factual, administrative, documentary, or within ordinary claim-handling competence.

Examples include missing bills, records, photographs, proof of ownership, repair documents, wage records, or receipts; a policy not in force on the date of loss; a claim occurring outside the policy period; a demand exceeding policy limits; conflicting driver or witness statements; a police report contradicting the claimant’s account; rental reimbursement sought beyond the documented repair period; or general damages evaluated within a reasonable range based on records, liability facts, venue, and comparable claim experience.

Even here, claim judgment does not mean unexplained discretion. It means reasoned evaluation of evidence in the claim file.

A practical plaintiff-side test: The specialized-conclusion rule

Plaintiffs’ lawyers should force the carrier to identify whether its position is factual, legal, or expert-dependent. The useful test is this: If the insurer’s denial, reduction, or refusal depends on a conclusion that an ordinary claims professional is not qualified to make without specialized knowledge, the carrier should identify the expert, professional, technical, or documentary evidence supporting that conclusion.

Ask the following questions: What exact conclusion is the insurer relying on? Is that conclusion medical, biomechanical, engineering, repair-related, economic, legal, or technical? Who made that conclusion? What are that person’s qualifications? What documents were reviewed? Did the insurer consider contrary evidence submitted by the claimant? Is the conclusion in writing? Was the decision made before or after the supporting investigation? Does the denial letter identify the factual and legal bases required by title 10, California Code of Regulations, section 2695.7? Does the file show a fair search for evidence supporting the claim, as required by Egan and Mariscal?

If the carrier cannot answer those questions, the reduction is not a reasoned evaluation. It is speculation.

Third-party claims: Why the issue still matters even without direct bad faith

In California, a third-party injured claimant generally cannot sue the tortfeasor’s insurer directly for unfair claims practices under Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h). Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 eliminated the direct private right of action under that statute.

But unsupported claim handling still matters. First, it may help show that liability and damages were reasonably clear under Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h)(5). Second, it may support a later failure-to-settle claim by the insured or by the claimant as assignee. Third, after judgment, Insurance Code section 11580, subdivision (b)(2), permits a judgment creditor to bring an action against the insurer on the policy, subject to the policy’s terms and limitations.

Thus, in third-party practice, the plaintiff’s goal is to build the record. The demand should force the carrier either to pay, disclose its evidentiary basis, or expose that its position is unsupported.

Demand-letter language for plaintiffs’ lawyers

Plaintiff counsel should not merely demand money. The demand should require the carrier to disclose the basis for any reduction or denial. Useful language includes:

“If the carrier contends that any medical treatment was excessive, unreasonable, unnecessary, unrelated, or not caused by the collision, please identify the medical professional who reached that conclusion, the records reviewed, the date of review, the opinions reached, and all documents supporting that position.”

“If the carrier contends that the vehicle damage or impact severity could not have caused the claimed injuries, please identify whether the carrier obtained any accident-reconstruction, biomechanical, engineering, or medical-causation analysis. If not, please confirm whether the carrier’s position is based solely on adjuster opinion.”

“If the carrier disputes liability or damages, please provide the written factual and legal basis for that dispute pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2695.7, subdivision (b)(1), and identify all evidence submitted by the claimant that the carrier considered pursuant to section 2695.7, subdivision (g).”

Conclusion

California law does not require insurers to accept every claim at face value. But it does require them to investigate before denying, to consider evidence supporting the claim, to explain the basis for denial or compromise offers, and to settle fairly when liability is reasonably clear.

The boundary is not difficult to draw. Adjusters may use professional judgment to evaluate evidence. They should not use personal judgment to replace evidence. When the insurer’s position turns on medical causation, medical necessity, biomechanics, accident reconstruction, repair causation, diminished value, or complex coverage analysis, the carrier should obtain competent support.

In plaintiff-side terms: “I think” is not a claim investigation. “It appears excessive” is not a medical opinion. “The impact was too minor” is not a biomechanical analysis. “We dispute causation” is not a factual basis. Without expert or competent technical support, those statements are not genuine disputes. They are claim-handling speculation. And speculation is not good faith.

Diana Grigoryan is a Los Angeles-based legal professional with approximately 19 years of experience in insurance law, civil litigation, constitutional and administrative litigation, procedural fairness, and access-to-justice matters. She has been licensed as an attorney in the Republic of Armenia since 2007 and holds an LL.M. in Trial Advocacy from Chicago-Kent College of Law. She successfully passed the California Bar Examination in February 2026, with remaining admission and licensing formalities pending. Her current work focuses on insurance-related compensation barriers, third-party liability claims, insurer defenses, claims-handling disputes, and litigation-oriented analytical frameworks for recurring civil disputes.