As attorneys for clients who have suffered harm, we do our best to obtain compensation for them. We are entitled to be paid for our work. Sometimes that work is handling a case from beginning to end. But there are variations. An attorney might refer a case to a colleague with the expectation of sharing fees. A case might require that another attorney is associated to provide assistance. A client might replace you with another attorney. This article explores your rights to be paid under common circumstances; when you might lose the right to be paid; and what to do when there is a fee dispute with another lawyer.
Attorney’s rights after being discharged
The written contingent fee agreement establishes what the client will pay the attorney if there is a successful outcome. However, the client has the absolute right to discharge an attorney, with or without cause, under Code of Civil Procedure section 284, and such a discharge does not constitute a breach of contract. The lawyer who was replaced is entitled to be paid based on quantum meruit – the value of the legal services rendered. (Fracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal. 3d 784.) The policy rationale is that the client should not be forced to pay the full contract price for services not rendered, which could result in double payment of fees to both the discharged and the new attorney. (Ibid.) The right to a share of the attorney fees does not accrue until the happening of the contingency, namely, the recovery of money. (Kroff v. Larson (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 857.)
The entitlement to quantum meruit does not require that the attorney-client agreement contain a specific provision that the attorney has a lien: “It is well settled that a contingency fee lawyer discharged prior to settlement may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services rendered up to the time of discharge.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 272.) Clients who sign a contingent fee agreement give their attorneys an equitable right to the value of services rendered. “Accordingly, clients who create such a right are obligated under the agreement to honor the right. (Little v. Amber Hotel Co. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 280, 295.) However, if there is a written lien provision in the agreement, the replaced attorney’s quantum meruit claim has priority over all other creditors. (Cetenko v. United California Bank (1982) 30 Cal.3d 528, 534.) Such priority is important because competing claims of litigation lenders and lien-based doctors could deplete the funds available to pay the replaced lawyer.
Protecting rights after discharge
Although the lien is created by contract, and a discharged attorney has a right to sue if the lien isn’t honored, the best practice is to give prompt written Notice of Lien to the client, successor counsel, the defense attorneys, and the payor (defendant or insurer). (Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1172.) It is also advisable to file the Notice of Lien in the pending lawsuit, even though the trial court has no jurisdiction to enforce or resolve the lien claim. (Bandy v. Mt. Diablo Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 230, 234.) Filing the notice with proof of service is evidence that notice was given. (Carroll, supra at p.1174.) Because an insurance company can be held liable to the discharged attorney if the settlement money is disbursed, it may insist on issuing a settlement check that lists the discharged attorney as one of the payees. (Fletcher v. Davis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 61, 69.)
If the discharged and successor attorneys can’t reach agreement regarding the division of fees, a separate, independent action must be filed to establish the existence of the lien, to determine the amount of the lien, and to enforce it. This lawsuit must include the client because the contract was with the client, who is the obligor under the lien. (Mojtahedi v. Vargas (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 974, 978.) Although Mojtahedi held that the existence of the lien must first be established before the court can allocate the attorney fees, only one lawsuit need be filed that names the successor attorney and the client. The cause of action is for declaratory relief. (Jacobs v. Papez (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 123, 130–131.) If the successor attorney distributed all of the settlement proceeds, the causes of action against that attorney and the client could also include: Money Had and Received; Conversion; Constructive Trust; and Intentional Interference with Contractual Relationship. (Weiss v. Marcus (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 590, 594.)
Lien rights after withdrawal
An attorney representing a client on a contingent fee basis can withdraw on the basis of a lack of confidence in a favorable outcome. That was the situation in Hensel v. Cohen (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 563, where the attorney described the case as “a dead-blank loser.” However, when the client subsequently achieved a favorable outcome, the court held that the former attorney held no lien and had no right to attorney fees (although the attorney had a right to be reimbursed for costs expended on behalf of the client.)
An attorney who withdraws because the client refused his advice to accept a settlement similarly has no lien and no right to claim attorney fees. In Estate of Falco (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1020, plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw because his clients refused to take his advice to accept an offer of settlement. Plaintiff’s attorney disclosed that he was ethically bound to withdraw because he was convinced that there was no reasonable chance to prevail. (Id., 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1011.) The Court granted the withdrawal motion based on the attorney’s claim that the failure to take his advice regarding settlement constituted failure to cooperate and that the attorney-client relationship had completely broken down.
When the clients subsequently achieved a settlement, their former attorney sued for his contingent fees, claiming that when the court had granted his motion to withdraw, it proved that he had good cause to withdraw. The Court of Appeal disagreed. First, the Court differentiated between permissive withdrawal and mandatory withdrawal and noted that, “While a personality clash between the parties may provide good reason for allowing the attorney to withdraw, it is not necessarily a justifiable reason for purposes of awarding fees.” (Id., 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1014.) The Court then explained:
A client’s right to reject settlement is absolute. To hold otherwise would deprive the client of his due process right to proceed to trial on the merits. The exercise of the right to reject settlement is implicit in the contract between a client and an attorney, and cannot constitute a breach of contract
. . . . A client’s exercise of this right cannot constitute cause for the purpose of awarding attorneys’ fees.
(Id., 188 Cal.App.3d at 1018.)
If a withdrawal is mandatory rather than permissive, lien rights are preserved. The California Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC), rule 1.16 specifies the grounds for mandatory withdrawal: The lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the client is pursuing an action without probable cause for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person; the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or the State Bar Act; the lawyer’s mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult to carry out the representation effectively. RPC rule 1.16(b) lists ten grounds for permissive withdrawal, including client conduct that renders representation unreasonably difficult. The distinction between mandatory and permissive withdrawal is critical: In Rus, Miliband & Smith v. Conkle & Olesten (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 656, the court held that a law firm’s withdrawal due to an alleged breakdown in communications fell under the permissive provisions of former rule 3-700(C)(1)(d) and, under the circumstances, was therefore not mandatory, barring quantum meruit recovery. Justice Sills explained why:
To allow an attorney under a contingency fee agreement to withdraw without compulsion and still seek fees from any future recovery is to shift the time, effort and risk of obtaining the recovery (economists would refer to these things as the “costs” of obtaining recovery) from the attorney, who originally agreed to bear those particular costs in the first place, to the client. The withdrawing attorney gets a free ride as to many of the headaches of litigation which he or she otherwise would have had to endure: answering the client’s phone calls, showing up for depositions, responding to discovery, fending off summary judgment motions, preparing for trial, fending off in limine motions, picking a jury, fending off motions for nonsuit, judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial if he or she does win, and then, at the end of it all, protecting the fruits of victory by responding to an appeal. It is a very tough row which a contingency fee attorney originally agrees to hoe. Thus it is unassailably unfair to allow him or her to escape that labor absent the most compelling of permissive reasons . . .
(Id., 113 Cal.App.4th 656, 675–676.)
The above analysis by Justice Sills did not rule out that a contingent fee attorney might be able to quantum meruit attorney fees after withdrawing because the client breached the contract to advance costs. A refusal to settle is not a breach of contract. (Estate of Falco, supra.) A refusal to honor contract terms requiring that costs be advanced or reimbursed promptly is a breach of contract and, although it is grounds for permissive withdrawal, it might also allow a lien. (See, e.g., Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 497.)
Enforcing the right to referral fees
It is common practice that when an attorney accepts a client referral from another attorney, a referral fee will be paid. However, the right to enforce payment of a referral fee will depend on whether there was full compliance with Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.5.1 which mandates that:
(a) Lawyers who are not in the same law firm shall not divide a fee for legal services unless:
(1) the lawyers enter into a written agreement to divide the fee;
(2) the client has consented in writing, either at the time the lawyers enter into the agreement to divide the fee or as soon thereafter as reasonably practicable, after a full written disclosure to the client of: (i) the fact that a division of fees will be made; (ii) the identity of the lawyers or law firms that are parties to the division; and (iii) the terms of the division; and
(3) the total fee charged by all lawyers is not increased solely by reason of the agreement to divide fees.
It is the obligation of the referring attorney to make sure that there has been strict compliance with rule 1.5.1. In Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142, Chambers referred a case to Kay. The two lawyers had a fee-sharing agreement, which was never approved by the client. When Chambers sued Kay for a share of the attorney fees, Kay’s defense was that the client had never given consent for the fee sharing, which was required by rule 2-200 (the predecessor to Rule 1.5.1). Chambers argued that the client consent requirement should not prevent him from receiving the promised share of attorney fees because Kay had intentionally not obtained client consent to the fee-sharing agreement. However, in denying Chambers’s claim for a share of the fees, the Supreme Court made it clear that regardless of the misconduct of Kay, Chambers was required to comply with the rule regarding client consent:
“Chambers could have protected his interests, and at the same time fulfilled the beneficial purposes of the rule and acted in Weeks’s best interests, by requesting proof of her written consent to the fee division before committing himself to her case.” (Id., 29 Cal.4th 142, 162B163.)
Allocating the fees between the lawyers
In general, the division of fees between the original and successor attorney is based on the number of hours that each devoted to the case. (Spires v. American Bus Lines (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 211, 216.) However, that is only the starting point, as the court observed in Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 272:
However, providing evidence as to the number of hours worked and rates claimed is not the end of the analysis in such a quantum meruit action. The party seeking fees must also show the total fees incurred were reasonable. Factors relevant to that determination include the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure of the attorney’s efforts, the attorney’s skill and learning, including his [or her] age and experience in the particular type of work demanded.
(Internal quotes omitted.)
The Mardirossian Court held that there is no requirement that a contingent fee attorney keep a record of the hours devoted to the case, and that expert testimony is appropriate to estimate the number of hours devoted and the reasonableness factors.
Determination of the value of services rendered is not necessarily limited to the hours devoted. For example, in Hance v. Super Store Industries (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 676, 694, the Court held that “factors more subjective than a mere hourly fee analysis” can be considered. This is consistent with Mardirossian, supra, which requires evaluation of the quality and reasonableness of the time devoted and not just a calculation of hours.
Final thoughts
This article does not attempt to explore every possible situation affecting the right to claim attorney fees or to oppose a claim of entitlement to a share of fees. For example, if an attorney successfully represents a client for the entire case but did not strictly comply with the requirements of Business & Professions Code section 6147, such failure “renders the agreement voidable at the option of the plaintiff, and the attorney shall thereupon be entitled to collect a reasonable fee.” (Id., subd. (b).)
Another situation that might affect entitlement to quantum meruit is when there was a serious conflict of interest that renders the services rendered to be “without value.” (Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 59, 92.)
Whether you are a successor attorney, the original attorney, or a referring attorney, it is important to understand the strict rules that govern your entitlement to be compensated for your work.
John P. Blumberg has been an attorney since 1976 and specializes in tort litigation. He has four board certifications: as a trial lawyer, a medical malpractice specialist, and a legal malpractice specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy, and as a legal malpractice specialist by the State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization. He is a member of the American Board of Trial Advocates (Advocate rank) and previously served on its national Board of Directors. He currently serves on the board of governors of the Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles with emeritus status and as its parliamentarian. He also serves on the national board of directors of the National Board of Trial Advocacy. He is the author of the book, Persuasion Science for Trial Lawyers (Persuasion Press, 2026: www.Persuasion-Science.com.) He has also authored over 60 articles dealing with law practice and trial advocacy that have been published in local, state and national law journals.
